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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTE-EFFECT OF UNCONDITIONAL
PARDON ON PRIOR CoNvICTsON.-Defendant was convicted of breaking and
entering and was sentenced to one year imprisonment. Judgment was set aside
and defendant resentenced to twenty years imprisonment under an habitual
offender statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the
judgment and held that since the offender had-received a full and uncondi-
tional pardon from a prior felony conviction, it could not be counted as a
prior conviction under the provisions of the Florida habitual offender statute.,
,Fields v. State, 85 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1956).
It appears that a majority of courts hold that a pardon from: a prior con-
viction does not exempt an accused from increased punishment under habitual
offender statutes.2 The reasoning of these courts is based on the idea that
the increased sentence for a second, third or fourth conviction is not added
punishment for the prior crime or crimes, but rather, the prior conviction
is only an element in determining the amount of increased punishment for
the present offense.3 These courts hold, in effect, that an unconditional pardon
does not remove all remaining consequences of a prior conviction.4
The minority view, holding that an unconditional pardon removes all such
consequences, is shared by Florida and a few other states. 5 One reason for
the division of authority is the judicial construction of the word "pardon"'!
The minority jurisdictions appear to follow an early decision of the United
States Supreme Court, which viewed a pardon as a removal of all guilt,"...
so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense."
It seems that the holdings of the minority jurisdictions are predicated upon
an intent to prevent increased subsequent sentences where the prior convic-
tion has been removed by a pardon for innocences Therefore, no rational rule
stating the effect of a pardon can be made without distinguishing clearly
between pardons granted for innocence and pardons granted for other reasons.
Where a pardon was granted because of after-discovered innocence, it is
arguable that since the party was mistakenly convicted he should not suffer
huther consequences from that conviction. Normally, if a man is innocent of
the offense charged, his remedy is found in the courts.' 0 Occasionally, however,
use of the executive pardon may be necessary to exonerate one who was
1. Fla Statutes §775.09 (1953).
2. State v. Webb, 36 N.D. 235, 244, 162 N.W. 358, 360 (1917) (dictum); Dean
v. Skeen, 137 W. Va. 105, 70 S.E.2d 256, 258, (1952) (dictum).
3. People v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468 (1941); People v. Carlesi 233
U.S. 51, 34 S. Ct. 576 (1941) (dictum); State v. Webb, 36 N.D. 235, 244, 162 N.W. 358
360 (1917) (dictum).
4. People V. Biggs, 9 Cal.2d 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937); Dean v. Skeen, 137 W.Va.
105, 70 S.E.2d 256 (1952).
5. Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 85 N.E.2d 453 (1933); State v. Lee, 171 La. 744,
132 So. 219 (1931).
6. Dean v. Skeen, 137 W. Va. 105, 70 S.E.2d 256, 259 (1952) (dictum).
7. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 33 (1866). But see Williston, Does a Pardon
Blot Out Guilt?, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 647 (1915).
8. Williston, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 647, 661 ("The fact that a pardon may infrequently
be the only redress whicIN is open to an innocent man operates as an injustice to the
innocent, but, as has been said, probably exerts a retroactive influence towards continuance
of the notion that a pardon makes a convict into a man of good character.").
9. 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 177 (1939).
10. E.g., Fla. Statutes § 924.01 (1953); N.D. Rev. Code J 29-2402 (Supp. 1953).
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wrongfully convicted. t At least two states have expressly provided by statute
thai preyious conviction will not be considered if pardon was granted for
reasons of innocence t2
It is unjust to give a pardon granted for innocence the same limited
application as i now generally given to pardons granted for other reasons.
There is no logical reason why pardons granted for innocence should not
conclusively prevent consideration of the pardoned conviction in an attempt
to apply an habitual offender statute. Recognizing that the executive and
judicial- power of a state should be separated as much as possible, exercise
of the pardoning power for reasons of innocence may be criticizable as an
executive review of a judicial decision.13 The principle of separation of powers
could be better adhered to by instituting an extraordinary judicial remedy
which would only lie whenever such evidence is discovered as would pre-
sefitly result in a pardon for innocence. If such a remedy were available and
made exclusive, all subsequently granted pardons would be granted for reasons
other than innocence. Where that is true, there appears to be no valid reason
why pardoned convictions should be considered in applying habitual offender
statutes.* It is submitted, that if the pardon in the instant case was granted
solely on the basis of innocence, the decision of the court is correct.
GERALD W. VANDEWALLE
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-
ATTORNEY PRAM TING IN STATE OTHER THAN ONE WHERE LICENSED.-In
a discovery proceeding,' plaintiff moved under Rule 34, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure2 for an orjier requiring the defendant to produce various
documents relating to prior patent litigation. The defendant excepted, con-
tending that certain of the documents were privileged as communications
with its attorney. The plaintiff contested the privileged status of the docu-
ments on the grounds that defendant's counsel was not licensed to practice
in New York where the communications and litigation took place. It was con-
ceded that counsel was a merisber of the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania
Bars. The court held that a lawyer regularly employed by a corporation as
legal counsel who actively participates in litigation qualifies as an "attorney"
within the rule of privileged communication between attorney and client,
though he is not licensed to practice in the state. Georgia-Pacific Plywood
Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
11. 28 Harv. L. Rev. 647, 659 (1915).
12. Iowa Code § 747 (1950); N. Y. Code of Crim.' Proc. § 697 (1953).
13. The Federalist No. 47 at 373 (Hamilton ed. 1885) (Madison).
1. See: Sundeland; Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules. 15 Tenn. L.
Rev. 737 (1939).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, "Discovery And Production of Documents And Things For
Inspection, Copying, or Photographing. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore and upon notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30 (b),
the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, book abcounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within
the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26 (b) and which are in his possession,
Custody, or control; . . .The order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making
the inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just." (Italics added)
